Causality

1. Causality definition is - a causal quality or agency. How to use causality in a sentence.
2. Causality can also be crucial to dealing with adversarial attacks, subtle manipulations that force machine learning systems to fail in unexpected ways. “These attacks clearly constitute violations of the i.i.d. Assumption that underlies statistical machine learning,” the authors of the paper write, adding that adversarial vulnerabilities.

1. Causality Tattoo
2. Causality In Research
3. Causality And Time Travel
4. Causality Vs Correlation
5. Causality Def

Causality is a fundamental Newtonian concept that responses are caused by stimuli. In systems, output signals are caused by input signals. In other words, responses cannot come before the thing they are responding to. Stated mathematically, the output of a system at t = t0 can only be due to an input signal, x (t), at t ≤ t0.

Each Aristotelian science consists in the causal investigation of aspecific department of reality. If successful, such an investigationresults in causal knowledge; that is, knowledge of the relevant orappropriate causes. The emphasis on the concept of cause explains whyAristotle developed a theory of causality which is commonly known asthe doctrine of the four causes. For Aristotle, a firm grasp of what acause is, and how many kinds of causes there are, is essential for asuccessful investigation of the world around us.

As will become clear in due course, Aristotle is committed to a formof causal pluralism (Stein 2011: 121–147). ForAristotle, there are four distinct and irreducible kinds of causes.The focus of this entry is on the systematic interrelations amongthese four kinds of causes.

1. Introduction

Aristotle was not the first thinker to engage in a causalinvestigation of the world around us. From the very beginning, andindependently of Aristotle, the investigation of the natural worldconsisted in the search for the relevant causes of a variety ofnatural phenomena. From the Phaedo, for example, we learnthat the so-called “inquiry into nature” consisted in asearch for “the causes of each thing; why each thing comes intoexistence, why it goes out of existence, why it exists” (96 a6–10). In this tradition of investigation, the search for causeswas a search for answers to the question “why?”. Both inthe Physics and in the Metaphysics Aristotle placeshimself in direct continuity with this tradition. At the beginning ofthe Metaphysics, Aristotle offers a concise review of theresults reached by his predecessors (Metaph. I 3–7).From this review we learn that all his predecessors were engaged in aninvestigation that eventuated in knowledge of one or more of thefollowing causes: material, formal, efficient and final cause.However, Aristotle makes it very clear that all his predecessorsmerely touched upon these causes (Metaph. 988 a 22–23;but see also 985 a 10–14 and 993 a 13–15). That is to say,they did not engage in their causal investigation with a firm grasp ofthese four causes. They lacked a complete understanding of the rangeof possible causes and their systematic interrelations. Putdifferently, and more boldly, their use of causality was notsupported by an adequate theory of causality. According toAristotle, this explains why their investigation, even when itresulted in important insights, was not entirely successful.

This insistence on the doctrine of the four causes as an indispensabletool for a successful investigation of the world around us explainswhy Aristotle provides his reader with a general account of the fourcauses. This account is found, in almost the same words, inPhysics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2.

2. The Four Causes

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle places the followingcrucial condition on proper knowledge: we think we have knowledge of athing only when we have grasped its cause (APost. 71 b9–11. Cf. APost. 94 a 20). That proper knowledge isknowledge of the cause is repeated in the Physics: we thinkwe do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why,that is to say, its cause (Phys. 194 b 17–20). SinceAristotle obviously conceives of a causal investigation as the searchfor an answer to the question “why?”, and a why-questionis a request for an explanation, it can be useful to think of a causeas a certain type of explanation.

Needless to say, not all why-questions are requests for an explanationthat identifies a cause, let alone a cause in the particular senseenvisioned by Aristotle. Still, Aristotle is clearly committed to theview that giving the relevant cause (or causes) is necessary andsufficient for offering a scientific explanation. His conception of acause has both a metaphysical and an epistemological component. Part of the challenge for us is to do justice to bothcomponents. Following a recent suggestion, we may say that“causes are not ways in which we explain things, exceptderivatively, in virtue of the fact that they are ways in which someelements of the natural world explain others” (Stein 2012a:705).

In Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2, Aristotleoffers his general account of the four causes. This account is generalin the sense that it applies to everything that requires anexplanation, including artistic production and human action. HereAristotle recognizes four kinds of things that can be given in answerto a why-question:

• The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g., thebronze of a statue.
• The formal cause: “the form”, “the account ofwhat-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a statue.
• The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change orrest”, e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue,the man who gives advice, the father of the child.
• The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which athing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losingweight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools.

All the four (kinds of) causes may enter in the explanation ofsomething. Consider the production of an artifact like a bronzestatue. The bronze enters in the explanation of the production of thestatue as the material cause. Note that the bronze is notonly the material out of which the statue is made; it is also thesubject of change, that is, the thing that undergoes the change andresults in a statue. The bronze is melted and poured in order toacquire a new shape, the shape of the statue. This shape enters in theexplanation of the production of the statue as the formalcause. However, an adequate explanation of the production of astatue requires also a reference to the efficient cause orthe principle that produces the statue. For Aristotle, this principleis the art of bronze-casting the statue (Phys. 195 a 6–8. Cf.Metaph. 1013 b 6–9).

This result is mildly surprising and requires a few words ofelaboration. There is no doubt that the art of bronze-casting residesin an individual artisan who is responsible for the production of thestatue. According to Aristotle, however, all the artisan does in theproduction of the statue is the manifestation of specific knowledge.This knowledge, not the artisan who has mastered it, is the salientexplanatory factor that one should pick as the most accuratespecification of the efficient cause (Phys. 195 b21–25). By picking the art, not the artisan, Aristotle is notjust trying to provide an explanation of the production of the statuethat is not dependent upon the desires, beliefs and intentions of theindividual artisan; he is trying to offer an entirely different typeof explanation–namely, an explanation that does not make areference (implicit or explicit) to these desires, beliefs andintentions. More directly, the art of bronze-casting the statue entersin the explanation as the efficient cause because it helps us tounderstand what it takes to produce the statue; that is to say, whatsteps are required to produce the statue. But can an explanation ofthis type be given without a reference to the final outcome of theproduction, the statue? The answer is emphatically “no”. Amodel is made for producing the statue. A mold is prepared forproducing the statue. The bronze is melted and poured for producingthe statue. Both the prior and the subsequent stage are for the sakeof a certain end, the production of the statue. Clearly, the statueenters in the explanation of each step of the artistic production asthe final cause or that for the sake of which everything inthe production process is done.

In thinking about the four causes, we have come to understand thatAristotle offers a teleological explanation of the productionof a bronze statue; that is to say, an explanation that makes areference to the telos or end of the process. Moreover, ateleological explanation of the type sketched above does not cruciallydepend upon the application of psychological concepts such as desires,beliefs and intentions. This is important because artistic productionprovides Aristotle with a teleological model for the study of naturalprocesses, whose explanation does not involve beliefs, desires,intentions or anything of this sort. Some have objected that Aristotleexplains natural process on the basis of an inappropriatelypsychological teleological model; that is to say, a teleological modelthat involves a purposive agent who is somehow sensitive to the end.This objection can be met if the artistic model is understood innon-psychological terms. In other words, Aristotle does notpsychologize nature because his study of the natural world is based ona teleological model that is consciously free from psychologicalfactors. (For further information on the role that artistic productionplays in developing an explanatory model for the study of nature, seeBroadie 1987, pp. 35–50.)

One final clarification is in order. By insisting on the art ofbronze-casting as the most accurate efficient cause of the productionof the statue, Aristotle does not mean to preclude an appeal to thebeliefs and desires of the individual artisan. On the contrary, thereare cases where the individual realization of the art obviously entersin the explanation of the bronze statue. For example, one may beinterested in a particular bronze statue because that statue is thegreat achievement of an artisan who has not only mastered the art buthas also applied it with a distinctive style. In this case it isperfectly appropriate to make reference to the beliefs and desires ofthe artisan. Aristotle seems to make room for this case when he saysthat we should look “for general causes of general things andfor particular causes of particular things” (Phys. 195a 25–26). Note, however, that the idiosyncrasies that may beimportant in studying a particular bronze statue as the greatachievement of an individual artisan may be extraneous to a morecentral (and more interesting) case. To understand why let us focus onthe study of nature. When the student of nature is concerned with theexplanation of a natural phenomenon like the formation of sharp teethin the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth, the student ofnature is concerned with what is typical about thatphenomenon. In other words, the student of nature is expected toprovide an explanation of why certain animals typically havea certain dental arrangement. We shall return to this example in duecourse. For the time being, it is important to emphasize thisimportant feature of the explanatory project attempted by Aristotle; afeature that we must keep in mind in trying to understand his theoryof causality. This theory has in fact been developed primarily (butnot exclusively) for the study of nature.

3. The Four Causes and the Science of Nature

In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account ofthe four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specificto the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four causesare involved in the explanation of natural phenomena, and that the jobof “the student of nature is to bring the why-question back tothem all in the way appropriate to the science of nature”(Phys. 198 a 21–23). The best way to understand thismethodological recommendation is the following: the science of natureis concerned with natural bodies insofar as they are subject tochange, and the job of the student of nature is to provide theexplanation of their natural change. The factors that are involved inthe explanation of natural change turn out to be matter, form, thatwhich produces the change, and the end of this change. Note thatAristotle does not say that all four explanatory factors are involvedin the explanation of each and every instance of natural change.Rather, he says that an adequate explanation of natural change mayinvolve a reference to all of them.

Aristotle goes on by adding a specification on his doctrine of thefour causes: the form and the end often coincide, and they areformally the same as that which produces the change (Phys.198 a 23–26). This is one of the several times where Aristotleoffers the slogan “it takes a human being to generate a humanbeing” (for example, Phys. 194 b 13; Metaph.1032 a 25, 1033 b 32, 1049 b 25, 1070 a 8, 1092 a 16). This slogan isdesigned to point at the fundamental fact that the generation of ahuman being can be understood only in the light of the end of theprocess; that is to say, the fully developed human being. The questionthus arises as to what it takes for a human being to be fullydeveloped. Aristotle frames his answer in terms of the human form,maintaining that a human form is fully realized at the end ofgeneration. But this does not explain why it takes a humanbeing to generate a human being. Note, however, that a fullydeveloped human being is not only the end of generation; it is alsowhat initiates the entire process. For Aristotle, the ultimate movingprinciple responsible for the generation of a human being is a fullydeveloped living creature of the same kind; that is, a human being whois formally the same as the end of generation. (A final clarificationis in order here: Aristotle is committed to a hylomorphic explanationof animal generation. His considered view is that the father suppliesthe form whereas the mother provides the matter.)

Thus, the student of nature is often left with three types of causes:the formal/final cause, the efficient cause, and the material cause.However, the view that there are in nature causes besides material andefficient causes was controversial in antiquity. According toAristotle, most of his predecessors recognized only the material andthe efficient cause. This explains why Aristotle cannot be contentwith saying that formal and final causes often coincide, but he alsohas to defend his thesis against an opponent who denies that finalcausality is a genuine mode of causality.

4. Final Causes Defended

Physics II 8 contains Aristotle’s most general defenseof final causality. Here Aristotle establishes that explaining naturerequires final causality by discussing a difficulty that may beadvanced by an opponent who denies that there are final causes innature. Aristotle shows that an opponent who claims that material andefficient causes alone suffice to explain natural change fails toaccount for their characteristic regularity. Before considering howthe defense is attempted, however, it is important to clarify thatthis defense does not perform the function of a proof. By showing thatan approach to the study of nature that ignores final causality cannotaccount for a crucial aspect of nature, Aristotle does not therebyprove that there are final causes in nature. Strictly speaking, theonly way to prove that nature exhibits final causality is to establishit on independent grounds. But this is not what Aristotle does inPhysics II 8. Final causality is here introduced as the bestexplanation for an aspect of nature which otherwise would remainunexplained.

The difficulty that Aristotle discusses is introduced by consideringthe way in which rain works. It rains because of material processeswhich can be specified as follows: when the warm air that has beendrawn up is cooled off and becomes water, then this water comes downas rain (Phys. 198 b 19–21). It may happen that thecorn in the field is nourished or the harvest is spoiled as a resultof the rain, but it does not rain for the sake of any good or badresult. The good or bad result is just a coincidence (Phys.198 b 21–23). So, why cannot all natural change work in the sameway? For example, why cannot it be merely a coincidence that the frontteeth grow sharp and suitable for tearing the food and the molars growbroad and useful for grinding the food (Phys. 198 b23–27)? When the teeth grow in just this way, then the animalsurvives. When they do not, then the animal dies. More directly, andmore explicitly, the way the teeth grow is not for the sake of theanimal, and its survival or its death is just a coincidence(Phys. 198 b 29–32).

Aristotle’s reply is that the opponent is expected to explainwhy the teeth regularly grow in the way they do: sharp teethin the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth. Moreover,since this dental arrangement is suitable for biting and chewing thefood that the animal takes in, the opponent is expected to explain theregular connection between the needs of the animal and theformation of its teeth. Either there is a real causal connectionbetween the formation of the teeth and the needs of the animal, orthere is no real causal connection and it just so happens that the waythe teeth grow is good for the animal. In this second case it is justa coincidence that the teeth grow in a way that it is good for theanimal. But this does not explain the regularity of theconnection. Where there is regularity there is also a call for anexplanation, and coincidence is no explanation at all. In other words,to say that the teeth grow as they do by material necessity and thisis good for the animal by coincidence is to leave unexplained theregular connection between the growth of the teeth and the needs ofthe animal. Aristotle offers final causality as his explanation forthis regular connection: the teeth grow in the way they do for bitingand chewing food and this is good for the animal. (See Code 1997:127–134.)

One thing to be appreciated about Aristotle’s reply is that thefinal cause enters in the explanation of the formation of the parts ofan organism like an animal as something that is good eitherfor the existence or the flourishing of the animal. In the first case,something is good for the animal because the animal cannot survivewithout it; in the second case, something is good for the animalbecause the animal is better off with it. This helps us to understandwhy in introducing the concept of end (telos) that isrelevant to the study of natural processes Aristotle insists on itsgoodness: “not everything that is last claims to be an end(telos), but only that which is best” (Phys.194 a 32–33).

Once his defense of the use of final causes is firmly in place,Aristotle can make a step further by focusing on the role that matterplays in his explanatory project. Let us return to the example chosenby Aristotle, the regular growth of sharp teeth in the front and broadmolars in the back of the mouth. What explanatory role is left for thematerial processes involved in the natural process? Aristotle does notseem to be able to specify what material processes are involved in thegrowth of the teeth, but he is willing to recognize that certainmaterial processes have to take place for the teeth to grow in theparticular way they do. In other words, there is more to the formationof the teeth than these material processes, but this formation doesnot occur unless the relevant material processes take place. ForAristotle, these material processes are that which is necessary to therealization of a specific goal; that which is necessary on thehypothesis that the end is to be obtained.

Hypothetical necessity is often equated to conditional necessity. Butthis equation can be a first approximation at best. Stating theconditions under which something is the case is not yet giving asuccessful explanation. In other words, conditional necessity is awider, and indeed weaker, notion than hypothetical necessity (seeStein 2016: 353–382, for a lucid reflection on this point).

Physics II 9 is entirely devoted to the introduction of theconcept of hypothetical necessity and its relevance for theexplanatory ambition of Aristotle’s science of nature. In thischapter, matter is reconfigured as hypothetical necessity. By so doingAristotle acknowledges the explanatory relevance of the materialprocesses, while at the same time he emphasizes their dependency upona specific end.

5. The Explanatory Priority of Final Causes

In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account ofthe four causes in order to provide the student of nature with theexplanatory resources indispensable for a successful investigation ofthe natural world. However, the Physics does not provideall the explanatory resources for all naturalinvestigations. Aristotle returns to the topic of causality in thefirst book of the Parts of Animals. This is a relativelyindependent and self-contained treatise entirely devoted to developingthe explanatory resources required for a successful study of animalsand animal life. Here Aristotle completes his theory of causality byarguing for the explanatory priority of the final cause over theefficient cause.

Significantly enough, there is no attempt to argue for the existenceof four fundamental modes of causality in the first book of theParts of Animals. Evidently, Aristotle expects his reader tobe already familiar with his general account of the four causes aswell as his defense of final causality. The problem that here concernsAristotle is presented in the following way: since both the final andthe efficient cause are involved in the explanation of naturalgeneration, we have to establish what is first and what is second(PA 639 b 12–13). Aristotle argues that there is noother way to explain natural generation than by reference to what liesat the end of the process. This has explanatory priority over theprinciple that is responsible for initiating the process ofgeneration. Aristotle relies on the analogy between artisticproduction and natural generation, and the teleological model that hehas developed for the explanation of artistic production. Consider,for example, house-building. There is no other way to explain how ahouse is built, or is being built, than by reference to the finalresult of the process, the house. More directly, the bricks and thebeams are put together in the particular way they are for the sake ofachieving a certain end: the production of the house. This is truealso in the case of natural generation. In this contextAristotle’ slogan is “generation is for the sake ofsubstance, not substance for the sake of generation”(PA 640 a 18–19). This means that the proper way toexplain the generation of an organism like an animal, or the formationof its parts, is by reference to the product that lies at the end ofthe process; that is to say, a substance of a certain type.

From Aristotle we learn that Empedocles explained the articulation ofthe human spine into vertebrae as the result of the twisting andturning that takes place when the fetus is in the womb of the mother.Aristotle finds this explanation unacceptable (PA 640 a19–26). To begin with, the fetus must have the power to twistand turn in the way it does, and Empedocles does not have anexplanation for this fact. Secondly, and more importantly, Empedoclesoverlooks the fact that it takes a human being to generate ahuman being. That is to say, the originating principle of thegeneration is a fully developed human being which is formally the sameas the final outcome of the process of generation. It is only bylooking at the fully developed human being that we can understand whyour spine is articulated into vertebrae and why the vertebrae arearranged in the particular way they are. This amounts to finding therole that the spine has in the life of a fully developed human being.Moreover, it is only by looking at the fully developed human beingthat we can explain why the formation of the vertebrae takes place inthe particular way it does. (For further information about theexplanatory priority of the final over the efficient cause, see Code1997: 127–143.)

Perhaps we are now in the position to understand how Aristotle arguesthat there are four kinds of causes and at the same time says thatproper knowledge is knowledge of the cause or knowledge ofthe why (APost. 71 b 10–12, 94 a 20;Phys. 194 b 17–20; Metaph. 981 a 28–30).Admittedly, at least at first sight, this is a bit confusing.Confusion dissolves when we realize that Aristotle recognizes theexplanatory primacy of the final/formal cause over the efficient andmaterial cause. Of course this does not mean that the other causes canbe eliminated. Quite the contrary: Aristotle is adamant that, for afull range of cases, all four causes must be given in order to give anexplanation. More explicitly, for a full range of cases, anexplanation which fails to invoke all four causes is no explanation atall. At the same time, however, the final/formal cause is the primarycause and knowledge of this cause amounts to knowledge of the why.

6. The Explanation of a Lunar Eclipse

We have already seen that Aristotle is not committed to the view thateverything has all four kinds of causes, Rather, his view is that ascientific explanation requires up to four kinds of causes. We mayillustrate this point with the help of an example. Consider, inparticular, the case of a lunar eclipse. In the Metaphysics,Aristotle says that an eclipse of the moon does not have a final cause(Metaph. 1044 b 12). He also says that, strictly speaking, alunar eclipse does not have matter. Rather, it has a cause that playsa role analogous to matter. This second claim can be inferredfrom what Aristotle says about the things that exist by nature but arenot substances. With respect to these things, Aristotle says that theydo not have matter but rather something that underlies(Metaph. 1044 b 8–9). In the case of a lunar eclipse,that which underlies is the subject affected by the eclipse, that is,the moon. The moon is not strictly speaking the matter of the eclipsebut rather the subject that undergoes an eclipse when the earth comesin the middle between the moon and the sun. Should we give the earthas the efficient cause of a lunar eclipse? We have to be careful here.By saying that the moon is a deprivation of light caused by the earth,we distinguish this particular deprivation of light from other kindsof deprivation of light. Still, by citing the earth as the efficientcause of a lunar eclipse, we are not yet giving the most precisedescription of the efficient cause. More directly, we are not yetsaying what the earth is doing to cause a lunar eclipse. A lunareclipse is a deprivation of light caused by the interposition of theearth between the sun and the moon. By coming in the middle of themoon and the sun the earth blocks the light and causes the moon tosuffer an eclipse. Hence, it is the interposition of the earth betweenthe sun and the moon is the proximate efficient cause of alunar eclipse. Citing the proximate efficient cause is also giving themost accurate description, and indeed the full explanation, of a lunareclipse. (An insightful discussion of how Aristotle explains naturalphenomena such as a lunar eclipse and sleep can be found in Code 2015:11–45).

This brief discussion of the explanation of eclipse of the moon bringsus back to a point that was already made in connection withAristotle’s explanation of the production of an artifact such as abronze statue. There too we are required to look for the most accuratedescription of the efficient cause, which is to be identified with theart of bronze-casting a statue rather than the artisan. It is possibleto build on both examples to conclude that Aristotle is concerned notonly with finding the relevant kinds of causes but also with givingthe most accurate description of those causes. By his lights, it isonly the most accurate description of all the relevant causes thatgives us the full explanation, and thereby scientific knowledge, ofsomething.

7. Conclusion

The study of nature was a search for answers to the question“why?” before and independently of Aristotle. A criticalexamination of the use of the language of causality by hispredecessors, together with a careful study of natural phenomena, ledAristotle to elaborate a theory of causality. This theory ispresented in its most general form in Physics II 3 and inMetaphysics V 2. In both texts, Aristotle argues that afinal, formal, efficient or material cause can be given in answer to awhy-question.

Aristotle further elaborates on causality in the rest ofPhysics II and in Parts of Animals I. Aristotleexplores the systematic interrelations among the four modes ofcausality and argues for the explanatory priority of the final cause.In so doing Aristotle not only expands on his theory of causality; healso builds explanatory principles that are specific to the study ofnature. Aristotle considers these principles an indispensabletheoretical framework for a successful investigation of the naturalworld. Both Physics II and Parts of Animals have afoundational character. More directly, Aristotle expects the studentof nature to have mastered these principles before engaging in theinvestigation of any aspect of the natural world.

Although Aristotle’s theory of causality is developed in thecontext of his science of nature, its application goes well beyond theboundaries of natural science. This is already clear from the mostgeneral presentation of the theory in Physics II 3 and inMetaphysics V 2. Here the four causes are used to explainhuman action as well as artistic production. In addition, anytheoretical investigation that there might be besides natural sciencewill employ the doctrine of the four causes.

Consider, briefly, the case of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.Here Aristotle is seeking wisdom. Part of the argument of theMetaphysics is in an attempt to clarify what sort of wisdomAristotle is seeking. Suffice it to say that Aristotle conceives ofthis wisdom as a science of substance that is, or is a part of, ascience of being qua being (for further information about thisargument, see the entry Aristotle’s Metaphysics, especiallySections 1 and 3.) What is important is that this science consists ina causal investigation, that is, a search for the relevant causes.This helps us to understand why the most general presentation ofAristotle’s theory of causality is repeated, in almost the samewords, in Physics II 3 and in Metaphysics V 2.Although the Physics and the Metaphysics belong totwo different theoretical enterprises, in both cases we are expectedto embark on an investigation that will eventuate in causal knowledge,and this is not possible without a firm grasp of the interrelationsbetween the four (types of) causes.

8. Glossary of Aristotelian Terminology

• account: logos
• art: technê
• artisan: technitês
• cause: aitia, aition
• difficulty: aporia
• end: telos
• essence: to ti ên einai
• form: eidos
• generation: genesis
• goal: telos
• knowledge: epistêmê
• hypothesis: hypothesis
• necessity: anankê
• principle: archê
• substance:ousia
• why: dia ti, dioti
• wisdom: sophia

Bibliography

General survey

• Frede, M., 1980, “The Original Notion of Cause,” in J.Barnes, M. F. Burnyeat, M. Schofield (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism:Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 217–249; reprinted in M. Frede, Essays in AncientPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989,125–150.
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• Shields, C., 2007, “Explaining Nature and Nature ofExplanation”, in C. Shields, Aristotle, London/NewYork: Routledge, 36–97.

The Four Causes

• Annas, J., 1982, “Inefficient Causes,”Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 311–322; reprinted in T.Irwin (ed.), Classical Philosophy. Collected Papers, NewYork/London: Routledge, 1995, 11–27.
• Bogen, J., 1974, “Moravcsik on Explanation,”Synthese, 28: 19–25.
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Art and Nature

• Broadie, S., 1990, “Nature and Craft in AristotelianTeleology,” in D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin (eds.),Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote, CNRS:Paris, 389–403; reprinted in S. Broadie, Aristotle andBeyond: Essays in Metaphysics and Ethics, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press 2010, 85–100. [This article is printed with thetitle “Nature, Craft, and Phronesis inAristotle,” Philosophical Topics, 15 (1987):35–50.]
• La Croce, E., 1976/1977,“El concepto aristotelico detecnica,” Ethos, 4: 253–265.
• Jacobs, W., 1978, “Art and Biology in Aristotle,” inG. C. Simmons (ed.), Paideia (Special Aristotle Issue),Brockport/Buffalo: State University College, 16–29.
• Solmsen, F., 1963, “Nature as Craftsman in GreekThought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 24:473–496; reprinted in F. Solmsen, Kleine Schriften,Hildesheim: Olms, 332–351.

Teleology and Necessity

• Balme, D., 1987, “Teleology and Necessity,” in A.Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues inAristotle Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,275–286.
• Bolton, R., 1997, “The Material Cause: Matter andExplanation in Aristotle’s Natural Science,” in W.Kullmann and S. Föllinger (eds.), AristotelischeBiologie, Stuttgart: Steiner, 97–126.
• Boylan, M., 1981, “Mechanism and Teleology inAristotle’s Biology,” Apeiron, 15:96–102.
• –––, 1984, “The Place of Nature inAristotle’s Teleology,” Apeiron, 18:126–140.
• Bradie, M., Miller, 1984, F. D., “Teleology and NaturalNecessity in Aristotle,” History of PhilosophyQuarterly, 1: 133–146.
• Byrne, C., 2002, “Aristotle on Physical Necessity and theLimits of Teleological Explanation,” Apeiron, 35:20–46.
• Cameron, R., 2002, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s FinalCause,” Apeiron, 35: 153–179.
• Charles, D., 1988, “Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity andIrreducibility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 69:1–53; reprinted in T. Irwin (ed.), Classical Philosophy.Collected Papers, New York/London: Routledge, 27–80.
• –––, 1991, “Teleological Causation in thePhysics,” in L. Judson (ed.), Aristotle’sPhysics: A Collection of Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press,101–128.
• –––, 2012, “Teleological Causation,”in C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 227–266.
• Cooper, J. M., 1982, “Aristotle on Natural Teleology,”in M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197–222; reprinted in J.M. Cooper, Knowledge, Nature and the Good: Essays on AncientPhilosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004,107–129.
• –––, 1985, “Hypothetical Necessity,”in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle on Nature and Living Things,Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications, pp. 150–167; reprinted in J.M. Cooper, Knowledge, Nature and the Good: Essays on AncientPhilosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004,130–147.
• –––, 1987, “Hypothetical Necessity andNatural Teleology,” in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.),Philosophical Issues in Aristotle Biology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 243–274.
• Friedman, R., 1983, “Matter and Necessity inPhysics B 9, 200 a 15–30,” AncientPhilosophy, 1: 8–12.
• Furley, D. J., 1999, “What Kind of Cause is Aristotle’Final Cause?,” in M. Frede and G. Stricker (eds.),Rationality in Greek Thought, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 59–79.
• Gotthelf, A., 1976/1977,“Aristotle Conception of FinalCausality,” Review of Metaphysics, 30: 226–254;reprinted with additional notes and a Postscript in A. Gotthelf and J.G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’sBiology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987,204–242. The original paper with the 1986 Postscript isreprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, andScientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 2012, 1–44
• –––, 1988, “The Place of the Good inAristotle’s Teleology,” in J. J. Cleary and D. C. Shartin(eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium in AncientPhilosophy, 4: 113–39; reprinted in A. Gotthelf,Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method inAristotle’s Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012,45–66
• –––, 1997, “UnderstandingAristotle’s Teleology,” in R. Hassing (ed.), FinalCausality in Nature and Human Affairs, Washington D.C.: CatholicUniversity Press, 71–82. A revised, updated, and expandedversion of this article is reprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology,First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’sBiology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 67–89.
• –––, 2012, “Teleology and Embryogenesis inAristotle’s Generation of Animals II 6,” in A.Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method inAristotle’s Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012,90–116.
• Henry, D., 2013, “Optimality and Teleology inAristotle’s Natural Science,” in Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy, 37: 225–261.
• Johnson, M. R., 2005, Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Judson, L., 2005, “Aristotelian Teleology,”,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 29: 341–365.
• Leunissen, M., 2010, Explanation and Teleology inAristotle’s Science of Nature, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• –––, 2010, “Nature as a Good Houskeeper.Secondary Teleology and Material Necessity in Aristotle’sBiology,” in Apeiron, 43: 117–142.
• Leunissen, M., and A. Gotthelf, 2010, “What’sTeleology Got to Do with It? A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’sGeneration of Animals,” Phronesis, 55:325–356; reprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, FirstPrinciples, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 117–141.
• Lewis, F., 1988, “Teleology and Material/Efficient Causes inAristotle,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 69:54–98.
• Nussbaum, M., 1978, “Aristotle on TeleologicalExplanation,” in M. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De motuanimalium, Princeton: Princeton University Press,59–99.
• Owens, J., 1968, “The Teleology of Nature,”Monist, 52: 159–173; reprinted J. R. Catan (ed.),Aristotle: The Collected Papers of J. Owens, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1981, 136–147.
• Pellegrin, P., 2002, “Les ruses de la nature etl’eternité du mouvement. Encore quelques remarques sur lafinalité chez Aristote,” in M. Canto-Sperber and P.Pellegrin (eds.), Le Style de la pensée. Recueil des textesen hommage à Jacques Brunschwig, Paris: Les BellesLettres, 296–323.
• Quarantotto, D., 2005, Causa finale, sostanza, essenza inAristotele, Saggi sulla struttura dei processi teleologici naturali esulla funzione dei telos, Napoli: Bibliopolis.
• Sauvé Meyer, S., 1992, “Aristotle, Teleology, andReduction,” Philosophical Review, 101, 791–825;reprinted in T. Irwin (ed.), Classical Philosophy. CollectedPapers, New York/London: Routledge, 1995, 81–116.
• Scharle, M., 2008, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’sPhysics II 8,” Oxford Studies in AncientPhilosophy, 34: 147–184.
• –––, 2008, “The Role of Material andEfficient Causes in Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy,” inApeiron, 41 (Special Issue: Aristotle on Life, J.Mouracade, ed.): 27–46.
• Sorabji, R., 1980, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
• Wieland, W., 1975, “The Problem of Teleology,” in J.Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles onAristotle, London: Duckworth, pp. 141–160; originallypublished as chapter 16, “Zum Teleologieproblem,” ofDie aristotelische Physik, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck undRuprecht, 1962.

Special Topics

• Bodnár, I., 2005, “Teleology across Natures,”Rhizai, 2: 9–29.
• Boeri, M. D., 1995, “Change and Teleology in AristotlePhysics,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 34:87–96.
• Code, A., 2015, “The Matter of Sleep,” in D. Ebrey, Theory and PRactice in Aristotle’s Natural Science,Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 11–45.
• Fine, G., 1987, “Forms as Causes: Plato andAristotle,” in A. Graeser (ed.), Mathematics and Metaphysicsin Aristotle, Bern: Haupt, 69–112.
• Furley, D. J., 1985,“The Rainfall Example inPhysics II 8,” in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle onNature and Living Things, Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications,177–182; reprinted in D. J. Furley, Cosmic Problems,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 115–120.
• –––, 2004, “Aristotle and the Atomists onForms and Final Causes,” in R. W. Sharples, Perspectives onGreek Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate, 70–84.
• Gaiser, K., 1969, “Das zweifache Telos beiAristoteles”, in I. Düring (ed.), Naturphilosophie beiAristoteles und Theophrast (4^th SimposiumAristotelicum), Heidelberg: Stiehm, 97–113.
• Gotthelf, A., 1989, “Teleology and Spontaneous Generation: ADiscussion,” Apeiron (Special Issue, Nature,Knowledge and Virtue, R. Kraut and T. Penner, eds.), 22 (4):181–193; reprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, FirstPrinciples, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology,Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, 142–150.
• Kullmann, W., 1985, “Different Concepts of the Final Causein Aristotle,” in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle on Nature andLiving Things, Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications,170–175.
• Lennox, J. G., 1984, “Aristotle on Chance,” Archivfür Geschichte der Philosophie, 66: 52–60; reprintedin J. G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 250–258.
• –––, 1982, “Teleology, Chance, andAristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation,” TheJournal of History of Philosophy, 20: 219–238; reprinted inJ. G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 229–249.
• –––, 1999, “Material and Formal Natures inAristotle’s De Partibus Animalium,” in J. G.Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999, 182–204.
• Pavlopoulos, M., 2003, “Aristotle’s Natural Teleologyand Metaphysics of Life”, Oxford Studies in AncientPhilosophy, 24: 133–181.
• Sedley, D., 1991, “Is Aristotle’s TeleologyAnthropocentric?” Phronesis, 36: 179–197.
• –––, 2010, “Teleology, Aristotle andPlato,” in R. Bolton and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Being, Nature,and Life. Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 5–29.
• Turnbull, R. G., 1958, “Aristotle’s Debt to the‘Natural Philosophy’ of the Phaedo,”Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 131–143.
• Wardy, R., 1993,“Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore ofAverages,” Phronesis, 38, 18–30.

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• Form and Function: Aristotle’s Four Causes, Podcast: The History of Philosophy ... without any gaps, byPeter Adamson.

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Causality Tattoo

Acknowledgments

Causality In Research

Thanks to Christopher Shields, Greg Salmieri, IstvánBodnár, and Mark Goodwin for commenting on drafts of thisentry.

Copyright © 2019 by
Andrea Falcon<Andrea.Falcon@concordia.ca>

The concept of causality, determinism.All certainty in our relationships with the world rests onacknowledgement of causality. Causality is a geneticconnection of phenomena through which one thing (the cause)under certain conditions gives rise to, causes something else(the effect). The essence of causality is the generation anddetermination of one phenomenon by another. In this respectcausality differs from various other kinds of connection, forexample, the simple temporal sequence of phenomena, of theregularities of accompanying processes. For example, apinprick causes pain. Brain damage causes mentalillness. Causality is an active relationship, a relationshipwhich brings to life some thing new, which turns possibilityinto actuality. A cause is an active and primary thing inrelation to the effect. But 'after this' does not alwaysmean 'because of this'. It would be a parody of justiceif we were to say that where there is punishment there musthave been a crime.

Causality is universal. Nowhere in the world can there be anyphenomena that do not give rise to certain consequences andhave not been caused by other phenomena. Ours is a world ofcause and effect or, figuratively speaking, of progenitors andtheir progeny. Whenever we seek to retrace the steps of causeand effect and find the first cause, it disappears into theinfinite distances of universal interaction. But the conceptof cause is not confined to interaction. Causality is only apart of universal connection. The universality of causality isoften denied on the grounds of the limited nature of humanexperience, which prevents us from judging the character ofconnections beyond what is known to science and practice. Andyet we know that no scientist restricts his reasoning to whathe can immediately perceive. The whole history of humanity, ofall scientific experiment knows no exception to the principleof determinism.

Causality And Time Travel

The connection between cause and effect takes place intime. This temporary relation may be defined in variousways. Some people believe that cause always precedes effect,thatthere is a certain interval between the time when the causebegins to act (for example, the interaction of two systems)and the time the effect appears. For a certain time cause andeffect coexist, then the cause dies out and the consequenceultimately becomes the cause of something else. And so on toinfinity.

Other thinkers believe that these intervals partiallyoverlap. It is also maintained that cause and effect arealways strictly simultaneous. Still others maintain that it ispointless to speak of a cause already existing and thereforetaking effect while the effect has not yet entered the sphereof existence. How can there be a 'non-effective cause'?

The concepts of 'cause' and 'effect' are used bothfor defining simultaneous events, events that are contiguousin time, and events whose effect is born with the cause. Inaddition, cause and effect are sometimes qualified asphenomena divided by a time interval and connected by means ofseveral intermediate links. For example, a solar flare causesmagnetic storms on Earth and a consequent temporaryinterruption of radio communication. The mediate connectionbetween cause and effect may be expressed in the formula: if Ais the cause of B and B is the cause of C, then A may also beregarded as the cause of C. Though it may change, the cause ofa phenomenon survives in its result. An effect may haveseveral causes, some of which are necessary and othersaccidental.

An important feature of causality is the continuity of thecause-effect connection. The chain of causal connections hasneither beginning nor end. It is never broken, it extendseternally from one link to another. And no one can say wherethis chain began or where it ends. It is as infinite as theuniverse itself. There can be neither any first (that is tosay, causeless) cause nor any final (i.e., inconsequential)effect. If we were to admit the existence of a first cause weshould break the law of the conservation of matter andmotion. And any attempt to find an 'absolutely first' or'absolutely final' cause is a futile occupation, whichpsychologically assumes a belief in miracles.

The internal mechanism of causality is associated with thetransference of matter, motion and information.

Effect spreads its 'tentacles' not only forwards (as anew cause giving rise to a new effect) but also backwards, tothe cause which gave rise to it, thus modifying, exhausting orintensifying its force. This interaction of cause and effectis known as the principle of feedback. It operates everywhere,particularly in all self-organising systems where perception,storing, processing and use of information take place, as forexample, in the organism, in a cybernetic device, and insociety. The stability, control and progress of a system areinconceivable without feedback.

Any effect is evoked by the interaction of at least twophenomena. Therefore the interactionphenomenon is the true cause of theeffect phenomenon. In other words, theeffect phenomenon is determined by the nature and state ofboth interacting elements. A word conveying tragically badnews may cause a condition of stress in a sensitive person,whereas it will bounce off an insensitive or phlegmaticindividual like 'water off a duck's back', leaving only aslight emotional trace. The cause of stress in this case wasnot the word itself but its information-bearing impact onvulnerable personality.

The cause-effect connection can be conceived as a one-way,one-directional action only in the simplest and most limitedcases. The idea of causality as the influence of one thing onanother is applied in fields of knowledge where it is possibleand necessary to ignore feedback and actually measure thequantitative effect achieved by the cause. Such a situation ismostly characteristic of mechanical causality. For example,the cause of a stone falling to the ground is mutualgravitation, which obeys the law of universal gravitation, andthe actual fall of the stone to the ground results fromgravitational interaction. However, since the mass of thestone is infinitely small compared with the mass of the earth,one can ignore the stone's effect on the earth. So ultimatelywe come to the notion of a one-way effect with only one body(the earth) operating as the active element, while the other(the stone) is passive. In most cases, however, such anapproach does not work because things are not inert, butcharged with internal activity. Therefore, in experiencingeffect they in their turn act on their cause and the resultingaction is not one-way but an interaction.

In complex cases one cannot ignore the feedback of the vehicleof the action on other interacting bodies. For example, in thechemical interaction of two substances it is impossible toseparate the active and passive sides. This is even more trueof the transformation of elementary particles. Thus theformation of molecules of water cannot be conceived as theresult of a one-way effect of oxygen on hydrogen or viceversa. It results from the interaction of two atoms ofhydrogen and one of oxygen. Mental processes are also a resultof the interaction of the environment and the cortex.

To sum up, all processes in the world are evoked not by aone-way or one-sided action but are based on the relationshipof at least two interacting objects.

Just as various paths may lead to one and the same place, sovarious causes lead to one and the same effect. And oneand the same cause may have different consequences. A causedoes not always operate in the same way, because its resultdepends not only on its own essence but also on the characterof the phenomenon it influences. Thus, the heat of the sundries out canvas, evokes extremely complex processes ofbiosynthesis in plants, etc. Intense heat melts wax buttempers steel. At the same time an effect in the form of heatmay be the result of various causes: sun rays, friction, amechanical blow, chemical reaction, electricity,disintegration of an atom, and so on. He would be a bad doctorwho did not know that the same diseases may be due todifferent causes. Headache, for instance, has more than onehundred.

The rule of only one cause for one effect holds good only inelementary cases with causes and effects that cannot befurther analysed. In real life there are no phenomena thathave only one cause and have not been affected by secondarycauses. Otherwise we should be living in a world of purenecessity, ruled by destiny alone.

To understand the cause that engenders a change in the stateof an object we should, strictly speaking, analyse theinteraction of the object with all other objects surroundingit. But experience shows that not all these interactions areequally significant in changing the state of the object. Someare decisive while others are insignificant. So, in practice,we are able to single out a finite number of decisiveinteractions and distinguish them from those that aresecondary.

In the sciences, particularly the natural sciences, onedistinguishes general from specific causes, the main from thesecondary, the internal from the external, the material fromthe spiritual, and the immediate from the mediate, withvarying numbers of intervening stages. The general cause isthe sum-total of all the events leading up to a certaineffect. It is a kind of knot of events with some very tangledthreads that stretch far back or forward in space andtime. The establishing of a general cause is possible only invery simple events with a relatively small number ofelements. Investigation usually aims at revealing the specificcauses of an event.

The specific cause is the sum-total of the circumstances whoseinteraction gives rise to a certain effect. Moreover, specificcauses evoke an effect in the presence of many othercircumstances that have existed in the given situation evenbefore the effect occurs. These circumstances constitute theconditions for the operation of the cause. The specific causeis made up of those elements of the general cause that aremost significant in the given situation. Its other elementsare only conditions. Sometimes an event is caused by severalcircumstances, each of which is necessary but insufficient tobring about the phenomenon in question.

Sometimes we can clearly perceive the phenomenon that givesrise to this or that effect. But more often than not avirtually infinite number of interlocking causes give rise tothe consequences we are concerned with. In such cases we haveto single out the main cause—the one which plays thedecisive role in the whole set of circumstances.

Objective causes operate independently of people's will andconsciousness. Subjective causes are rooted in psychologicalfactors, in consciousness, in the actions of man or a socialgroup, in their determination, organisation, experience, knowledge, and so on.

Immediate causes should be distinguished from mediate causes,that is to say, those that evoke and determine an effectthrough a number of intervening stages. For example, a persongets badly hurt psychologically, but the damage does not takeeffect at once. Several years may elapse and then in certaincircumstances, among which the person's condition at the timehas a certain significance, the effect begins to make itselffelt in the symptoms of illness. When analysing causality wesometimes speak of a 'minor' cause giving rise to majoreffects. This so-called 'minor cause of a major effect'is the cause not of the whole long and ramified chain ofphenomena that produces the final result, but only the causeof the first link in the chain. Sometimes the 'minorcause' is merely a factor that starts up quite differentcausal factors. These are 'triggering' factors, factorsrelating to the initial stage of avalanche processes and to awhole system's loss of labile equilibrium.

Any phenomenon depends on a definite diversity of conditionsto bring it into existence. While it is only one of thecircumstances conducive to a certain effect, the cause is themost active and effective element in this process, it is aninteraction that converts necessary and sufficient conditionsinto a result. We sometimes treat the absence of something asa cause. For example, some illnesses are attributed to lack ofresistance in an organism or a lack of vitamins. However,absence should not be regarded as a cause but merely as acondition for disease. For a cause to actually take effectthere must be certain conditions, that is to say, phenomenaessential for the occurrence of the given event but not inthemselves causing it. Conditions cannot in themselves giverise to the effect, but the cause is also powerless withoutthem. No cause can give rise to illness if the organism is notsusceptible to it. We know that when a person's organism isinfected with certain microbes he may fall ill or he maynot. The way a cause takes effect and the nature of theconsequence depend on the character of theconditions. Sometimes there is only one direct and immediatecause of death or injury—a bullet. But more often thecauses and conditions are intricately combined, some of thembeing only secondary circumstances.

When discussing the relationship of cause and condition onemust remember that the term 'condition' is used in twosenses, the narrow and the broad. Apart from what we mean bycondition in the narrow sense, conditions in the broad sensecomprise such factors as 'background' and'environment' and various factors of a causal nature. Butthere is no strict and consistent dividing line between thetwo basic senses of the term, just as there is no dividingline between condition and cause. This fact often leads to anincorrect use of the two terms and to wrong definition of thevarious conditioning factors. Avoidance of incorrect usage ismade all the more difficult by the overlapping of the acceptedmeanings of the two terms 'cause' and 'condition'and also the term 'foundation'.

Science is gradually evolving special concepts relating to thecategories of 'foundation', 'condition' and'cause', which, when used together with these categories,make it possible to define genetic links more exactly.

In various fields of knowledge the problem of the relationshipbetween cause and condition is solved in different ways,depending mainly on the complexity of the relationships thatare being studied, their uniformity or, on the contrary, thedistinctness and comparative importance of separatefactors. But the degree of abstraction usually employed in thegiven science also affects the treatment of this question. Sothe meaning of the cause and condition categories in thesystem of concepts of various sciences may also differconsiderably. One could scarcely apply the relation of causeand condition that is revealed in studying, for example,physical phenomena, to physiological processes, or vice versa.

Every phenomenon is related to other phenomena by connectionsof more than one value. It is the result both of certainconditions and certain basic factors that act as itscause. That is why the cause-effect connection has to beartificially isolated from the rest of conditions so that wecan see this connection in its 'pure form'. But this isachieved only by abstraction. In reality we cannot isolatethis connection from the whole set of conditions. There isalways a closely interwoven mass of extremely diversesecondary conditions, which leave their mark on the form inwhich the general connection emerges. This means that therecan never be two exactly identical phenomena, even if they aregenerated by the same causes. They have always developed inempirically different conditions. So there can be no absoluteidentity in the world.

One and the same cause operating in similar conditions givesrise to similar effects. When we change the conditions we mayalso change the way the cause operates and the character ofthe effect. But this principle becomes far more complex whenit is applied to such unique events as those of geology andsocial science. While stressing the close connection betweencause and condition, we should never confuse the two. Thedividing line between them is mobile but significant.

By creating new conditions we can even preclude the earlierpossible causes of a certain event, that is, we can'veto' the manifestation of one cause and allow free playto another. This explains the fact that by no means everycause unfailingly produces the expected effect.

A distinction should be made between cause and occasion, thatis to say, the external push or circumstance that sets inmotion a train of underlying interconnections. For instance, ahead cold may be the occasion for the onset of variousdiseases. One should never exaggerate the significance ofoccasions, they are not the cause of events. Nor should oneunderestimate them because they are a kind of triggeringmechanism.

Causality Vs Correlation

One way of discovering causal connections is to studyfunctional connections. The causes of illness may be revealedby uncovering certain breakdowns in the functioning of theorganism. A functional connection is a dependence of phenomenain which a change in one phenomenon is accompanied by a changein another. Whereas, for example, a sociologist may beinterested in population growth over a period of time and aphysicist may be investigating changes in gas pressure inrelation to changes of temperature, a mathematician sees hereonly a functional dependence of X on Y.

The functional approach is particularly useful when we arestudying processes whose intrinsic causal mechanism is unknownto us. But when we wish to explain a phenomenon we have to askwhat caused it.

The concept of cause is identical not to the general conceptof regularity but to the concept of causal regularity, whichexpresses the fact that a regular sequence of phenomena andconditions always takes the form of realisation of causalconnections.

In science the deterministic approach seeks to explain aprocess as being determined by certain causes and thereforepredictable. Thus determinism is not a mere synonym forcausality. It involves the recognition of objective necessity,which in turn implies objective accidentality. Hence there isa close connection between the category of determinism andthat of probability. The relationship between determinism andprobability is one of the crucial philosophical problems ofmodern science. In quantum mechanics it is associated with theindeterminacy relation, and in living nature with that ofcause and aim. Determinism should not be contrasted toprobability. There is no special 'probabilisticcausality'. But there do exist probability, statistical laws,which are one of the forms of manifestation of determinism.

Determinism proceeds from recognition of the diversity ofcausal connections, depending on the character of theregularities operating in a given sphere. Every level of thestructural organisation of being has its own specific form ofinteraction of things, including its specific causal relationships. Higher forms of causal relationships should never bereduced to lower forms. From a methodological point of view itis essential to take into account the qualitativepeculiarities and level of the structural organisation ofbeing.

The dialectical approach is incompatible with mechanisticdeterminism, which interprets all the diversity of causes onlyas mechanical interaction, ignoring the unique qualities ofthe regularities of various forms of the motion ofmatter. Determinism was given its classical expression byLaplace, who formulated it as follows: if a mind could existthat knew at any given moment about all the forces of natureand the points of application of those forces, there would benothing of which it was uncertain and both future and pastwould be revealed to its mental vision.

Mechanistic determinism identifies cause with necessity andaccident is completely ruled out. Such determinism leads tofatalism, to faith in an overruling destiny. The developmentof science has gradually ousted mechanistic determinism fromthe study of social life, organic nature, and the sphere ofphysics. It is applicable only in certain engineeringcalculations involving machines, bridges and otherstructures. But this kind of determinism cannot explainbiological phenomena, mental activity, or the life of society.

The character of causality is conditioned by the levels of thestructural organisation of matter. In nature causalitymanifests itself in a different way from its manifestation insociety. And in human behaviour causality emerges in the formof motivation. In nature determination acts in only onedirection, from the present, which is a result of the past, tothe future. Because of people's knowledge of the world, humanactivity is determined not only by present things but also bythings, objects, events that are absent, not only bywhat surrounds man but also by that which may be far away fromhim in time and space, not only by the present and the past,but also by the future, which is viewed as an aim and becomesa motivation for men's activity. Determination may thus have atwo-way direction. Knowledge introduces the future into thedetermining principle of the present.

The animal's active relationship with the environment isassociated with a new type of determination: the conditioningof its behaviour by the task with which it is confronted. Forexample, birds build their nests in order to breed their youngand protect them.

Causality Def

The principle of determinism involves recognition of theobjectivity, the universality of causal connections and hasalways played a vastly important methodological and heuristicrole in scientific cognition. The primary assumption for anyscientific research has always been that all events of thenatural and intellectual world obey a firm regular connection,known as the law of causality. Any field of knowledge wouldcease to be scientific if it abandoned the principle ofcausality.

Causality and purpose. When observing theastonishing adaptation and 'rational' organisation ofplants and animals, or the 'harmony' of the celestialspheres, people even in ancient times asked themselves wherethis harmonious organisation of all that exists had comefrom. Thinkers have proceeded from various principles intrying to explain this phenomenon. The teleologists assumethat there is an underlying purpose in everything, that atbottom nature has some intrinsic expectation and intention andis full of hidden meaning.

The idea of teleology arises when a spontaneously operatingcause comes to be regarded as a consciously acting cause, andeven one that acts in a predetermined direction, that is tosay, a goal-oriented cause. This implies that the ultimatecause or aim is the future, which determines the processtaking place in the present. The doctrine that the universe asa whole is proceeding according to a certain plan cannot beproved empirically. The existence of an ultimate goal assumesthat someone must have put it. Teleology therefore leads totheology. Instead of giving a causal explanation of why thisor that phenomenon occurred in nature, teleology asks for whatpurpose it occurred. And to prove his case the teleologistusually refers to the purposeful structure of organisms innature. One has only to observe the structure of the wing of abutterfly, the behaviour of an ant, a mole, a fish, in orderto realise how purposefully everything is constructed. Thecrudest form of teleology is the claim that nature providessome living creatures for the sake of others, for example,cats are provided in order to eat mice andmice are there to provide food for cats. The goal of the wholeprocess of evolution of the animal world is man and all theother animals were created to make things comfortable for man.

Heinrich Heine tells the story of the contented bourgeois witha 'foolishly knowing' face who tried to teach him theprinciples of such teleology. He drew my attention, saysHeine, 'to the purpose and usefulness of everything innature. The trees were green because the green colour was goodfor the eyes. I agreed with him and added that God had createdcattle because beef tea was good for man's health, that He hadcreated the donkey so that people could make comparisons, andthat He had created man himself so that man could eat beef teaand not be a donkey. My companion was delighted at finding afellow thinker in me, he beamed with joy and was quite sorryto leaveme.'[1]

Heine took the humorous view, but the scientific argumentagainst teleology in nature was provided by Darwin, who notonly struck a blow at teleology in the natural sciences butalso gave an empirical explanation of its rationalmeaning. Teleology feeds on the belief that everythingrevolves around us and has us in mind. Instead of giving acausal explanation why this or that natural phenomenonoccurred, teleology offers conjectures about the purposeserved by its appearance. But can one ask nature, as though itwere a rational being, why it created such a strange world offorms and colours? Can one accuse it of malicious intent whenit produces ugliness? Nature is indifferent, it does not carewhether it creates a lion or a fly. The relative perfectionthat allows its creatures to orient themselves in theenvironment, the adaptation to conditions and the adequacy oftheir reactions to external stimuli, which is found in allanimals and plants, are real facts. The structure, forexample, of the stem of a plant can serve as a model for anarchitect who sets himself the task of designing the strongestpossible structure with the smallest quantity of materials andthe greatest economy in weight. Spinoza, who provided asplendid criticism of teleology in his day, did not denypurpose in the structure of the human body. He urged us not togape at it 'like a fool' but to seek the true causes ofthe miracles and consider natural things with the eyes of ascientist. This was exactly what Darwin did, and he revealedthe naturalmechanism of this amazing adaptiveness of the organism to theconditions of its existence. His theories on natural selectionshowed that delightful blossoms exist not to please ouraesthetic feelings or to demonstrate the refinement of theAlmighty's taste, but to satisfy the extremely earthly needsof vegetable organisms, i.e., the normal process ofpollination and perpetuation of the species.

Changes in the world of animals and plants come about throughinteraction with their conditions of life. If these changesbenefit the organism, that is to say, help it to adapt to theenvironment and survive, they are preserved by naturalselection, become established by heredity and are passed onfrom generation to generation, thus building up the purposefulstructure of organisms, the adaptiveness to the environmentthat strike our imagination so forcibly. Brightly colouredflowers attract the insects by means of which pollinationtakes place. The beautiful plumage of male birds was developedby means of sexual selection. But adaptation is neverabsolute. It always has a relative character and turns intoits opposite when a radical change in conditions occurs, ascan be seen, for example, from the existence of rudimentaryorgans.

To sum up, then, what we have is selection without a selector,self-operating, blind and ruthless, working tirelessly andceaselessly for countless centuries, choosing vivid externalforms and colours and the minutest details of internalstructure, but only on one condition, that all these changesshould benefit the organism. The cause of the perfection ofthe organic world is natural selection! Time and death are theregulators of its harmony.